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Explicating the information
vacuum: stages, intensifications,
and implications
Eugene Woon and Augustine Pang
Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Abstract
Purpose – Information vacuums (IVs) arise from organizational failure to satisfy the stakeholders’
informational demands during crises. The purpose of this paper is to expand Pang’s (2013) study of the
phenomenon of IV by investigating its nature, stages, intensifying factors and resolution.
Design/methodology/approach – Print and social media data of five recent international crises with
apparent IVs were analyzed.
Findings – Poor crisis communications are intensifying factors that induce media hijacks and hypes,
distancing, and public confusion. A four-stage model maps the phenomenon into a flow chart describing its
development. IV termination begins when organizations either respond with information or provide solutions,
results, and/or compensation. Natural and strategic silence were observed and defined.
Research limitations/implications – The study lays the foundation for future examination of how media
literacy, governments, and culture, both societal and organizational, induce or exacerbate the phenomenon.
Practical implications – Immediate, adequate, transparent, credible, and consistent crisis responses
manage the IV and crisis, diminish the intensification of subsequent crises, and potentially reduce image and
reputational damages.
Originality/value – The knowledge of the phenomenon is further developed and new theoretical models are
conceptualized to provide researchers and practitioners a clearer understanding of how an IV can develop,
persist, deepen, and resolve.
Keywords Crisis, Silence, Life cycle, Information vacuum, Strategic transparency
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
The occurrence of a crisis is a ubiquitous anomaly, whereby the publics’ search for more
information spurs the media’s demand for answers, birthing the information vacuum (IV )
(Coombs, 2012). Organizations can either pre-empt the IV by “stealing the thunder”
(Arpan and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005, p. 426) or escalate it by avoiding the media. As the IV is
made increasingly public through widespread social media exposure, a deluge of misleading
information can be detrimental to the affected organization (Coombs, 2015a; Pang, 2013b).
Presently, even though there are studies that have established the IV’s presence, nature,
effects, and characteristics ( for instance, see Pang, 2013b), few have examined the stages of
the IV as well as the prevalence, traction, and growth of the social media hype. In this study,
both social media and media hypes are examined as factors influencing the IV.
This study examines five international crises to elucidate the IV’s mechanics, probable
stages, intensifying factors, and organizational actions that lead to its resolution. This study
is significant because it provides new theoretical perspectives that attempt to further
explicate the IV’s nature and the events that occur within it, and establishes new grounds
for future research and exploration. It aids practitioners and organizations in understanding
how poor initial actions could potentially escalate both the IV and the crisis. This study
would also interest practitioners as it provides them with an understanding of what can be
done to resolve the crisis, as well as to reduce the media and social media glare on the
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organization. Lastly, the study’s findings allow organizations to monitor their progress
through the IV during a crisis and aid them in post-crisis learning for better management
and communication.
Literature review
Clarifying the nature of the IV: strategic crisis management perspective of the IV
From a strategic crisis management viewpoint, the responsibility to fill the information
or communication void (Coombs, 2012; Timberg and Dehghanpisheh, 2012) rests with
communication practitioners and their top management. According to Clark (2000), the top
management believes that only it has the ability to make strategic decisions for the
organization, as this symbolizes its power, control and presence in decision making ( James and
Wooten, 2010). Such monopolization of the crisis management planning process shows the top
management’s disregard for full organizational involvement in successful strategic crisis
management (Dandira, 2012). This either signifies or leads to poor internal crisis
communication, an absence of crisis preparedness culture (Frandsen and Johansen, 2011),
and establishes barriers in accessing the top management (Bowen, 2009). One of the key
theories used in analyzing crises (An and Cheng, 2010), the contingency theory of strategic
conflict management, which offers a list of factors that influence crisis stance (Pang et al., 2010),
identifies the management’s conservative and authoritarian characteristics as long-term internal
organizational threats (Pang et al., 2010). This could conceivably contribute to the IV. However,
this paper focuses on the organizations’ observable actions contributing to the IV rather than
organizational factors leading to the IV.
Journalistic perspective of the IV
Organizations have utilized media gagging to conceal information from the public.
This allows them to hide behind a screen of information blackout. Mackey (2014) described
the information blackout as an information suppression effort to conceal facts from the
public, while Babchenko (2008) argued it to be voluntary or enforced censorship. With the
internet and social media allowing widespread access to all, enforced censorship or media
gagging is nearly impossible to enforce (Gruber et al., 2015; Mackey, 2014; Pang, 2013a;
Penuel et al., 2013). Thus, it may be reasoned that the IV is due to deliberate self-censorship.
Journalism perceives the IV as a news vacuum arising from surveillance limitations
(Hermida, 2012) with the media reducing its reliance on audience-generated content as soon
as news professionals provide coverage (Bruno, 2011). This suggests that the IV is media
driven rather than public driven (Marra, 2004). With the increase of user-to-user
dissemination (Lindsay, 2011) or information surrogates like online eyewitness accounts,
photos, videos, and real-time social media status updates forming the news vacuum
(Hermida, 2012), this suggests a public-driven dimension to the IV. Hence, there is a need to
study social media’s roles and effects on organizations during crises.
IV as mediated social pressure
To avoid legal complications, criticisms, or investigations that could worsen a crisis, some
organizations adopt intentional silence by shunning media queries with use of the phrase
“no comment” or remaining silent to avoid lending credence to rumors and speculations
(Pang, 2013b). Some believe the problem would dissipate with their silence (Fearn-Banks,
2011; Penuel et al., 2013). Others adopt unintentional silence when they lack confirming
information (Dearstyne, 2007; Penuel et al., 2013) or possess mixed information (Bagin and
Fulginiti, 2005; Penuel et al., 2013).
As stakeholders’ curiosity causes them to prioritize the legacy news media as their
primary source of information during a crisis (Pang, 2013b), their demand for answers
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motivates the media to fulfill its surveillance role (Heath, 2006) by looking to organizations
for answers and turning to other avenues when that fails (Pang, 2013b). Contrary to
Babchenko’s (2008) belief that “any action inevitably provokes a response; the blow is often
returned with the same force” (p. 116), organizations’ silence during crises provokes a
response intensified by public dissatisfaction and media glare. This results in a “vicious
cycle” (Pang, 2013b, p. 209) of societal pressure and informational demand exerted by the
media and stakeholders, which births the IV (Pang, 2013b, Penuel et al., 2013). Hence, the IV
can be understood as a mediated societal pressure on a troubled organization due to
informational demand and supply disparities.
IV as lack of situational favorability
Misinformation and hearsay are formed during the process of information seeking, driven
by the need to fill the void (Penuel et al., 2013). The organization’s silence and non-
committal remarks compound the IV. Susceptible media-reliant stakeholders are exposed
to inaccuracies, which affect their mental and emotive perceptions (Mackey, 2014;
Pang, 2013b; Penuel et al., 2013). Besides organizational silence, an IV also arises from
insufficient or absent essential information and unsatisfactory replies. At the onset of a
crisis, adjusting and/or instructing information (Coombs, 2015b) may be needed to soothe
emotions. However, in later stages, factual, reliable, and conclusive information is required
to satisfy the need for information. This indicates that different information is demanded
at different stages of a crisis (Penuel et al., 2013), exemplifying Cook and Brown’s (1999)
argument that knowledge is created by action rather than mere possession. Thus, the IV is
“neither a straightforward lie nor the withholding of facts” (Babchenko, 2008, p. 117),
but instead demonstrates the organization’s inability to “get the right information to the
right person at the right time” (Penuel et al., 2013, p. 529). However, the question of why
organizations choose silence remains. Therefore, the first research question examines:
RQ1. Why do organizations remain silent in an IV?
IV as violation of social expectation
The neo-institutional theory states that stakeholders believe organizations’ behavior should
be consistent with societal norms or expectations (Coombs and Holladay, 2011). Hence, in
expounding this theory, an IV could be considered as a violation of societal norms and
expectations (Coombs and Holladay, 2011). Moreover, an IV contributes to damage to an
organization’s image because its silence causes stakeholders and media alike to view the
organization as being guilty and/or secretive (Pang, 2013b). As an IV is caused by a lack of
information and draws attention away from the crisis toward itself, it can arguably be
considered a double crisis ( Johansen and Frandsen, 2007). In situational crisis
communication theory, a key theory used in analyzing crises (An and Cheng, 2010)
offering a list of crisis response strategies based on antecedent factors like crisis history and
organization’s reputation (Coombs, 2010), the IV can be categorized as a preventable crisis
with high attributed responsibility that damages the organization’s image. This study
further examines two related questions:
RQ2. What happens in an IV and what are its intensifying factors?
RQ3. What leads to the closure or termination of an IV?
Scope of media hype and social media hype
Due to strong feelings created by a crisis, stakeholders yearning for clarity and direction
would actively hunt and revisit information sources for updates (Westerman et al., 2014) to
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cope with their situation. The publics’ persistent information-seeking efforts are
proportionately represented by their demands for answers (Coombs, 2006; White, 2009).
This supports the earlier notion that a strong informational demand must be reciprocated
by the organization. Because of information scarcity, legacy and social media then become
vital sources of crisis information (Coombs, 2014; Johnson and Kaye, 2010). This results in
two phenomena: media hype and social media hype.
Media hype. Media hype is defined as a “media generated, wall-to-wall news wave,
triggered by one specific event, and enlarged by the self-reinforcing processes within the
news production of the media” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 515). During which, the salience of
interpretations, definitions, emphases, presence, and absence of information are intensified
by secondary-level agenda-setting (White, 2009). This generates a media hype that is either
magnified, employing relevant, in-depth, and episodic reporting, or enlarged, which utilizes
broad thematic reporting (Vasterman, 2005). Vasterman (2005) argued that four conditions
must be present for a media hype to occur: a key event that receives much media attention; a
rapid rise and gradual fall of a news wave; the media keeping the news in the headlines
instead of reporting new developments in the news by churning “comparable incidents or
linking them to key event” (p. 516); and an interaction between the media and newsmakers
resulting in increased coverage of “social action” and “reactions from social actors” (p. 516).
Social media hype. Building on media hype is social media hype, defined as a “netizen-
generated hype that causes a huge interest that is triggered by a key event and sustained by
a self-reinforcing quality in its ability for users to engage in conversations” (Pang, 2013a,
p. 309). This involves “a trigger event, followed by interest waves, and sustaining of the
interests on different social media platforms” (Pang, 2013a, p. 309). Rapid advances in
communication technologies have exponentially improved connectivity, enabled two-way
crossovers of hypes across platforms, and provided additional crisis “breeding grounds”
(Pang et al., 2014, p. 97). As social media becomes increasingly crucial for individuals and
organizations to seek, create, and share content that reaches out to a wide audience
(Penuel et al., 2013; Westerman et al., 2014), it allows issues to gain traction and develop into
a social media hype. Due to experiential and emotional resonance, stakeholders are
motivated to create content and share their experiences, emotions, and thoughts, which
magnifies the hype due to the medium’s reach and stakeholders’ vast relational connections
(Austin et al., 2012; Pang, 2013a).
Concept of the IV lifespan
At present, there is no research indicating how long an IV will last (Pang, 2013b).
However, it has been established that an IV is sustained by both the media hype and
social media hype. A media hype is expected to last about three weeks (Vasterman, 2005;
Wein and Elmelmund-Praestekaer, 2009), while a social media hype experiences fatigue
after two to three interest waves (Pang, 2013c). Hence, it is reasonable to say that an IV’s
lifespan hovers between the duration of these two phenomena. This study thus further
examines the following:
RQ4. What happens when an IV remains unresolved?
RQ5. What are the stages within an IV?
Method
Limited research on the IV prompted this exploratory study to adopt Wan et al.’s (2015) case
study method. In order to encourage greater rigor in the study, the cases were examined
using Mann’s (2003) cross-sectional method to obtain greater prevalence and identification
of associations. According to Mann (2003), cross-sectional studies are used to determine
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prevalence, which is the number of cases at a given point in time, and is a crucial factor to
explore because it vastly affects the possibility of any phenomenon and the “predictive
value of any investigation” (p. 56). It is used to infer causation, whereby the researcher can
determine whether stakeholders were exposed to a certain phenomena or exhibited a
particular behavior (Mann, 2003) at different stages of the crises.
Data collection: case selection and sources
Five international cases were selected based on the following selection criteria: the
organizational crisis must experience an IV due to either its inadequate initial response or its
lack of response; an IV must have existed for a period of time; for the purpose of range and
diversity, only one case is selected per country; the cases should occur no later than
five years before this study; and it should display media hype on at least two legacy media.
The summary of the five identified cases and data is presented in Table I. The search for
relevant articles pertaining to the respective crises was conducted on Factiva and two
sources with the largest number of articles on the crises were chosen. This was followed by
a search on the official social media platforms of the organizations involved for posts and
comments on the respective crises. In cases where the search yielded little to no result, data
were collected from public social media platforms; for instance, comments were collected
from Hardwarezone’s forums for the case involving Singapore.
We were unable to collect data uniformly from a single social media source as we
discovered that some online platforms do not yield sufficient data for analysis. For example,
Cases Descriptions Data Source and Volume
Fonterra
(New Zealand)
On August 3, 2013, New Zealand’s dairy
conglomerate had a massive recall due to a possible
botulism contamination. It triggered accusations of
the company withholding prior information and
only informing the government two days later
90 online articles from
The New Zealand Herald
35 online articles from The Press
(Christchurch)
8,994 tweets from Twitter
Maggi (India) On April 30, 2015, Maggi noodles faced a recall
after high lead and monosodium glutamate levels
were found in the testing of a sample batch. After
posting an official answer on its website and
Facebook, its parent company kept quiet for weeks
before further action
170 online articles from Press Trust
of India
170 online articles from The Times
of India
835 comments from New Delhi
Television Limited’s (NDTV)
Facebook page
Singapore General
Hospital
(Singapore)
On October 6, 2015, SGH revealed 25 patients and
seven deaths between April and June 2015 were
connected to a hepatitis C virus infection within the
hospital. SGH suspected the use of multi-dose
insulin vials might have been responsible for the
infection
34 online articles from Channel
NewsAsia
73 online articles from The Straits
Times
548 comments from Hardwarezone
(public forum)
Sony (USA) On April 14, 2011, Sony discovered its system was
hacked and took the PlayStation Network (PSN)
offline for security and diagnostic reasons. Sony
broke its silence six days later when it replied on its
blog that the PSN would be under maintenance,
fueling subscribers’ suspicions
42 online articles from PCMagazine
23 online articles from The
Washington Post
13,062 comments to 19 official blog
posts on Sony PlayStation
(North America)
MH370 (Malaysia) On March 8, 2014, when flight MH370 failed to
arrive in Beijing, Malaysian Airline System (MAS)
released a statement on its official Facebook page
announcing its disappearance. While multiple
parties had made attempts to locate the missing
plane, the underlying causes remain unanswered
7 online articles from Berita Harian
16 online articles from Bernama
Daily Malaysian News
379 comments to 6 official posts on
Malaysian Airlines’ Facebook page
Table I.
Summary of cases
and data
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in Sony’s case, the organization communicated to its stakeholders through its official blog,
where netizens converged to express their sentiments, while its Facebook page was used to
communicate product launches and did not carry any news of the crisis. In the case of
MH370, Malaysia Airlines’ Facebook posts had reasonable social media hype. In the case
with Singapore General Hospital (SGH), the organization’s Facebook posts exhibited weak
social media hype in comparison to a stronger hype on a public forum. In Fonterra’s case,
the social media hype was stronger on Twitter than Facebook, which justified our data
collection from Twitter. Likewise, there was greater social media hype on New Delhi
Television Limited’s Facebook page than on Maggi’s Twitter or Facebook page.
The collected data were archived chronologically and three databases, which formed the
basis for examination using the cross-sectional method to establish common patterns and
behaviors, were established: articles from legacy media; social media posts by the
organizations; and online responses from stakeholders in response to the crisis.
Data analysis
To identify the key stages according to Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) constant comparative
method for inductive data analysis, the collected data were analyzed using the four stages:
comparing the incidents in each case; integrating the categories; delimiting the theory; and
writing the theory.
Comparisons of online articles and stakeholders’ responses on social media for each case
were made to investigate: how the crisis began; the organizations’ initial and subsequent
response(s); reactions from the public; and the eventual outcome of the situation. These
categories form a partial framework of what Glaser and Strauss (1967) described as “local”
concepts (p. 45) that provided the starting points for this study. The data collected from each
case were used to establish “initial evidence” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p. 23). From the data,
additional emergent categories that serve as concepts to illuminate the concept surfaced.
Inductive thinking was employed as this functioned well in generating categories when there
was a lack of knowledge about a phenomenon (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). Based on Glaser and
Strauss’ (1967) recommendation, the study identifies emergent categories to retain theoretical
sensitivity before merging with existing concepts. Continuous comparisons among the data to
identify areas of similarities and differences helped establish the characteristics of the
categories and enhanced their explanatory abilities. The conceptual categories generated from
the data were then used to illuminate the concept of the IV.
For instance, for RQ1, the steps where evidence was unearthed included:
(1) The initial evidence was that the five organizations were silent during their
respective crises. Data supporting that observation included descriptors like “the
firm first identified a possible ‘quality issue’ in March” (Wade et al., 2013) for the
Fonterra crisis; “day five of Sony’s PlayStation network dawned Monday … Sony
confirmed last Friday that the protracted downtime was in response to an apparent
hacking attempt” (Hachman, 2011) for the Sony crisis; “barring a solitary press
release in two weeks, the company ignored the issue” (The Times of India, 2015c) for
the Maggi crisis; “the Workers’ Party has asked the Ministry of Health why it took
four months to release information about the spread of hepatitis C” (Khalik, 2015b)
for the SGH crisis; and “no indication of Malaysia Airlines (MAS) flight MH370…
been reported missing more than 24 hours ago” (Bernama Daily Malaysian News,
2015b) for the Malaysia Airlines crisis.
(2) These were used to comparatively identify the presence and duration of organizational
silence during the crises. Subsequently, descriptors such as “Mr Joyce said Fonterra
blamed ‘procedural issues’ for the communication delays” (Wade et al., 2013), and “do
not test for clostridium botulinum at that stage” (Moore, 2013) for the Fonterra case;
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“MOH explained that it lists only acute cases…This was why it had not reacted to the
earlier reports of hepatitis C … they were classified as chronic” (Khalik, 2015c) for
the SGH case; and “waited to tell consumers about the leak until it fully understood the
scope of the problem” (Tsukayama, 2011b) for the Sony case were used to explore why
organizations adopted silence and the type of silence used during crises.
(3) Subsequently, the phenomenon observed were comparatively examined to identify
properties such as “prudence” (Sony), “limitations” (MH370, SGH, and Sony), and
“bureaucracy” (Fonterra) that served as emergent concepts.
(4) Once the data were verified, the various natures of the multiple emergent concepts
were inductively derived to examine the organizational silence.
Findings and discussion
RQ1 examined why organizations remained silent in an IV. Both natural and strategic
silences were identified from the cases. This study defines silence as a lack of
communication from an organization or its failure to provide clear and adequate responses
to questions and concerns raised. Natural silence is defined as arising from unfavorable
situations, obstacles, and limitations that prevent an organization from swiftly obtaining
and disclosing essential information to stakeholders (Penuel et al., 2013). For example, the
protracted silence by Fonterra, Maggi, and SGH was due to the complexity of their food and
health crises, where contamination and infection were inherently difficult to identify
and verify, and required time-consuming laboratory tests to ascertain. Similarly, Sony
experienced natural silence due to the intricacy of its network issues as it struggled to
understand its digital crisis. Conversely, the investigators and authorities involved in
MH370 were limited to providing updates and adjusting information without any definitive
answers to questions due to the lack of information. Thus, rather than strategically adopting
silence, it appears that organizations were unwittingly “forced” into silence.
Aside from natural silence, in order to reduce the risk of miscommunication during a
crisis, some organizations adopted strategic silence, which manifested as them keeping
communication to a minimum while working to obtain information to share later. For
instance, when Sony was questioned on its eight-day delay in notification of the security
risk, the organization replied that it “waited to tell consumers about the leak until it fully
understood the scope of the problem” (Tsukayama, 2011b). Similar attempts were observed
in the cases of Fonterra and SGH. When Fonterra detected botulism bacteria in March 2013,
it began testing and verifying the exact strain until July (Moore, 2013) before it broke its
silence. Likewise, SGH took months to identify subsequent cases of hepatitis C infection
from its first cluster detection (The Straits Times, 2015c). Such actions indicate that the
organizations had the intention to resolve the publics’ knowledge gap by working to provide
answers that they were initially unable to give. It also suggests that these organizations had
incomplete important information that they were unable to release publicly, even at the
potential cost of endangering stakeholders, until they understood the situation. Other
demonstrations of strategic silence included a one-day silence on April 24, 2011 when Sony
called in a second computer security company to determine the issues with its network
(Williams, 2011), as well as Sony’s and Maggi’s preserving silence (Dimitrov, 2015), where
they addressed stakeholders via social media. Preserving silence accentuates the presence of
strategic silence as it grants information or communication lower visibility by situating it
beyond the immediate periphery of most stakeholders (Dimitrov, 2015). It is achieved by
harmonizing “silence and voice, visibility and invisibility” (p. 646), which suggests one
“(does) not talk about it because it has not been part of the rhetoric, but there is no reason
why it should not become part of the rhetoric” (Dimitrov, 2015, p. 646). Table II summarizes
the causes and duration of the IV.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 S
in
ga
po
re
 M
an
ag
em
en
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 1
8:
02
 2
0 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
8 
(P
T)
Having discussed the two types of silence, there is the danger of confusing
strategic silence with evasive silence. Evasive silence manifests when an organization
deliberately maintains silence indefinitely until the crisis goes away (Penuel et al., 2013;
Fearn-Banks, 2011) or it is forced to speak up. However, such silence was not observed in
this study as the five organizations eventually spoke up.
RQ2 looked at what happens in an IV and what the intensifying factors are. The five
organizations were blamed for their inadequate initial responses and silence, which
increased stakeholders’ distress and anxiety, and even led to wild speculations in the
instances of MH370, Maggi, SGH, and Sony. For example, in the case of MH370, there were
rumors of the plane landing in Nanning (Malaysia Airlines, 2014) or crashing into the sea
(Yip, 2014), as well as speculations of mid-air explosions, bad weather, terrorism threats, and
hijacks (Bernama Daily Malaysian News, 2015a). This was exemplified by the sharp
increase in comments made on March 8 (see Figure 1(b). In Maggi’s case, several believed
corruption and bribery, involving the organization and government officials, caused
the crisis (Pune, 2015; Sengar, 2015). In the cases involving Maggi and MH370, the persistent
lack of information soured the initially supportive online sentiments as netizens became
increasingly frustrated, which caused them to question the organizations’ capabilities.
Likewise, delayed communication by Sony and SGH caused stakeholders to question the
organizations’ legitimacy and honesty. This resulted in other voices chiming in and
intensifying the antagonistic online stance against the organizations as shown by
SGH’s peaked social media hype (see Figure 2(b)) and Sony’s growing social media
hype (see Figure 3(b)).
Forum users speculated that SGH’s hepatitis C outbreak was caused by a disgruntled
nurse who was dismissed from the hospital for his seditious social media posts (Kindaichi83,
2015; Satayxp, 2015). Several netizens even suggested that the hospital deliberately delayed
announcing the crisis so as not to affect the ruling party’s performance during the national
elections ( Jedihan, 2015; Mancunian2, 2015; Miaoyin, 2015; MrCoconut, 2015). Speculations
and accusations were the main drivers of SGH’s social media hype (see Figure 2(b)), which
began as a peak because a crisis of such scale involving a reputable hospital had previously
been inconceivable in Singapore. In Sony’s case, the lack of information led several to
assume either Anonymous, the hacker group that had earlier attacked the organization, was
responsible for the crisis or that Sony was “botching something on their end” (Nahela, 2011).
Although Figure 3(b) showed an escalating social media hype that peaked on April 23, there
was a fair amount of social media support for Sony found within the hype. This observation
was supported by Hachman (2011), who reported that stakeholders were “full of praise” for
Sony “who simply posted […] with no real news” (paragraph 2). In both cases, the presence
of supportive stakeholders served to ameliorate hostile sentiments as they urged agitated
netizens to be reasonable and rational, reminded others of the organizations’ efforts and
Cases Crisis difficulties
Approximate vacuum
duration
Fonterra Exact strain of botulism bacteria and its lethality are difficult to identify Approximately 5 months
Maggi Multiple nationwide tests to ascertain safety of Maggi’s noodles for
consumption yielded disparaging results
Approximately 3 weeks
MH370 Absence of plane wreckage and inability to locate the plane’s black box Approximately 2 years
and 11 months
SGH Protocols were not designed for detecting unusual and unfamiliar
outbreaks, and some traits of the hepatitis C virus make it hard to detect
Approximately 4 months
Sony Exact nature of external intrusion of the network was unknown.
Forensic analysis requires days of thorough investigation
8 days
Table II.
Causes and duration
of information
vacuum of cases
studied
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 S
in
ga
po
re
 M
an
ag
em
en
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 1
8:
02
 2
0 
D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
8 
(P
T)
limitations, and served as a voice of reason against unfounded accusations, conspiracies,
and assumptions, which kept online intensification of the IV in check.
The dissemination of conflicting messages by Fonterra, Maggi, and Malaysia Airlines
created more questions, confusion, and frustrations, which weakened the stakeholder’s
confidence. For example, stakeholders were initially informed of the recall of Stage 2
Karicare formula and were advised to switch to the Stage 1 formula. But Fonterra’s delayed
communication to the Ministry of Primary Industries caused the government to create an
impression of providing conflicting messages when it announced that Stage 1 products
were affected too (Wade and Eriksen, 2013). Parents, who were vexed by this, commented
that “just because there’s been a cock-up at Fonterra doesn’t mean there has to be a
cock-up in how the information is detailed” (Wade and Eriksen, 2013) and “I blame Fonterra
for failing to notify the Government and the public as soon as they knew of the
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contamination” (Wade and Eriksen, 2013). This caused a five-fold increase in media hype
between August 4 and 5 (see Figure 4(a)), and an increase of more than two times in
social media hype, which peaked on August 5 (see Figure 4(b)). Similarly, confusion was
apparent when commissioner Harshdeep announced that the samples from Mumbai
contained permissible levels of lead on June 8, but Minister Bapat later declared the ban
stating that three samples had high levels of lead (The Times of India, 2015d). Surprisingly,
Figure 5(a)-(b) showed a decline in media hype and social media hype between June 8 and 30.
This could be due to news of Maggi being banned in multiple states, subjected to intensified
tests, and removed from shelves.
In the case of MH370, there was initial conflicting information as to when the plane was
last heard, the ambiguity regarding the plane’s crash or landing, speculations of hijacks by
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passengers with stolen passports and of the plane turning back to Malaysia, and confusion
caused by smoke and oil slicks in Vietnamese waters, and debris separately reported by
Japan, China, Thailand, Australia, and Vietnam. These led to a commonly observed spike on
social media during the early stages of the IV (see Figures 4(b), 5(b), 2(b), 1(b)), where
extreme views, speculations, and rumors sustained and amplified the social media hype by
gaining other stakeholders’ attention, prompting more questions and views, and weakening
the organization’s narratives.
Another intensifying factor identified was the government’s involvement or intervention.
Crises invariably attract scrutiny from authorities (see Pang, 2013d). The official
investigations and inquiries conducted could raise additional questions that could enlarge
the IV. For example, when Sony released information that stakeholders’ personal
information was compromised (Seybold, 2011), Representative Markey demanded that Sony
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explain why the data were not encrypted and its plans to protect compromised stakeholders
(Albanesius, 2011). The New York Attorney General also issued a subpoena to obtain more
information on how Sony protects its stakeholders’ data (Tsukayama, 2011d). Although the
authorities’ intervention resulted in a media hype peak on April 27 (see Figure 3(a)), a trough
in social media hype (Figure 3(b)) was observed as stakeholders were more concerned with
the restoration of the PlayStation Network for gaming purposes.
Similarly, the Ministry of Health released a timeline on October 8 to summarize the
events leading to SGH’s announcement of the hepatitis C outbreak within SGH (The Straits
Times, 2015b), which resulted in more questions (Khalik, 2015c) and speculations of whether
“protectiveness and scenario-planning” or “pressures, external or self-imposed, that had
made civil and public servants … leave their political leaders out of the loop until the
elections were over” (Chang, 2015). Subsequently, the Ministry of Health established an
independent review committee to “provide a critical review of SGH’s investigation and
findings” (Khalik, 2015a). Surprisingly, similar to Sony’s case, Figure 2(a)-(b) showed a lull
instead of an escalation in media hype and social media hype upon the formation of the
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review committee. This could be due to netizens theorizing that the relatively silent media
was “giving face” to the organization and authorities (Laneige, 2015), and stakeholders were
keeping quiet or had forgotten about the issue (McBoogerballs, 2015; Treeskull, 2015).
Conversely, in MH370’s case, the provision of diverse information by multiple governments
and agencies, rather than a single coherent voice by Malaysia Airlines, led to confused
communication and frustrated stakeholders.
The findings also demonstrated that related parties would distance themselves from the
affected organization to avoid being incriminated with wrongdoing or protect their
reputation. In the five cases, distancing was exemplified by Amitabh Bachchan stating that
he had stopped endorsing Maggi (Press Trust of India, 2015; The Times of India, 2015a);
Changi General Hospital, Tan Tock Seng Hospital, and the National Kidney Foundation
insisting they had stringent safety protocols in place (Channel NewsAsia, 2015; Lai, 2015a);
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Fonterra’s business partner, Nestlé, claiming that its products were unaffected as it did not
purchase any of the recalled products (Sethchemz, 2013); and Anonymous, a group of
hackers who had previously hacked Sony, denying responsibility for the incident
(Tsukayama, 2011a). As a result of distancing, certain areas of speculations were closed,
which narrowed and refocused the media’s attention on the organizations, their unresolved
issues, and intensified calls for answers. For example, when other medical organizations
distanced themselves from the hepatitis C limelight, the media regularly reminded readers of
SGH’s delayed communication to the relevant authorities, and its procedural and
communication lapses. In the cases of Maggi and SGH, the distancing of related parties led
to a shift in sentiments but did not result in any significant spikes in social media hype as
shown in Figure 5(b) and Figure 2(b). Similarly, stakeholders renewed their call for Sony to
state when the network would be back online, compensation for the inconvenience caused,
and culprit(s) responsible for the intrusion. This caused the social media hype to peak on
April 23 (Figure 3(b)), a day after Anonymous distanced itself from the issue (Yin, 2011).
RQ3 explored the factors leading to the closure or termination of an IV. The IV is
essentially a knowledge gap that is constructed and sustained by unanswered questions
and issues. Its reduction or closure is heralded by: the provision of answers, information,
and enhanced preventive measures (Fonterra and SGH); releasing plans for compensation
and restoration to operational normalcy (Sony); and the provision of evidence to show
product safety was not compromised and stakeholders were never at risk (Fonterra and
Maggi). When test results showed Fonterra’s botulism scare to be a false alarm and Sony
announced the restoration of its network, Figure 4(b) and Figure 3(b) showed a final spike in
social media hype, in which stakeholders generally expressed relief. This means that a spike
in social media hype could also signify the resolution of an IV and the crisis.
Government interventions and involvement of authorities aided in the termination of the
IV as official investigations expedited the process of finding answers. This means that
governments may intervene not only when organizations are suspected of withholding
information from stakeholders, but also to expedite the process of gathering information
and sense-making to swiftly quell public dissatisfaction and safeguard stakeholders’
well-being. An independent inquiry for Fonterra provided stakeholders with an
understanding of “things that went wrong” (Independent Inquiry for Fonterra Board,
2013, pp. 5-6) with 23 operational and ten governance recommendations for improvements
(Independent Inquiry for Fonterra Board, 2013). In SGH’s case, an independent review
committee ruled out “drug diversion, foul play or sabotage, and contaminated medical
products,” and concluded the cause of the hepatitis C outbreak to be poor infection
prevention and control measures (Lai, 2015a, paragraph 2). A new task force was also
established to improve the monitoring and discovery of infectious diseases (The Straits
Times, 2015d) to prevent the recurrence of such infection. When the independent review
committee provided answers to the crisis on December 8, the media hype peaked the next
day (Figure 2(a)) but social media hype remained low (Figure 2(b)). This could be due to
Singaporeans’ trust in the local media for updates and the government to be accountable
to stakeholders. Thus, even when an organization initially fails to “get the right information
to the right person at the right time” (Penuel et al., 2013, p. 529), provision of information that
answers questions provides stakeholders closure and helps to terminate the IV.
RQ4 studied what happens when an IV remains unresolved. Fonterra and Sony were
found to have some unanswered questions remaining after the closure of their respective
crises, which constituted to the continued existence of an unresolved IV. Like MH370,
Sony was still unable to reveal the culprit(s) responsible for its network outage in 2011.
Meanwhile, Fonterra had to explain to an inquiry its five-month silence that occurred
between the detection of the botulism contamination and the crisis outbreak, delayed
communication to the government, the processes it went through upon detection of the
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contamination, and its overall approach to the crisis (Trevett, 2013). Unlike in the cases of
Maggi and SGH, some unanswered questions remained even with the resolution of
Fonterra’s and Sony’s crises, suggesting that it was questions regarding compromised
( food, credit, or human) safety and restoration to operational normalcy that sustained the
phenomenon. This means that unanswered questions do not bear equal weight in an IV;
some are prioritized for simultaneous IV and crisis resolution (Maggi and SGH), while others
are allowed continued existence beyond their crises’ closure and sustained by strategic
(Fonterra) or persistent natural silence (MH370 and Sony).
This study proposes the “Information vacuum hibernation model” (Figure 6) to explain what
happens when an IV remains unresolved. When an IV is unresolved and sustained by both
natural and strategic silence, the organization cannot afford to remain in a state of crisis for
extended periods of time as it needs to recover and restore itself to normalcy. In MH370’s case,
the search costs $200 million ( Joint Agency Coordination Centre, 2017) but yielded little result.
Eventually, the authorities terminated the investigation without proper resolution and allow the
IV to hibernate in limbo. For example, the search for the missing plane utilized the assistance of
at least six countries – Australia, New Zealand, the USA, Japan, China, and the Republic of
Korea (Australian Maritime Safety Authority, 2017) – in a search area of 120,000 square
kilometers and yielded the discovery of 33 pieces of wreckages (Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, 2017). Whenever there were new developments or discoveries that could provide
answers, such as the discovery of parts and debris, media and stakeholders’ interest in the issue
would be revived. Similarly, interest revives whenever there are articles on the arrests of
suspects related to cyber attacks on Sony. This led the phenomenon to continue existing in
alternating states of hibernation and revived interest until answers are provided for its
resolution, as demonstrated in the model below.
RQ5 examined the stages within an IV. From RQ1-RQ4, we had systematically
examined the IV from its beginning to resolution and beyond. As such, four stages were
observed: “beginning, escalation, resolution, and limbo” (see Table III). These stages are not
New
information
Unhelpful
information
Useful
information
Hibernation
Revival of
interest
Resolution of
information
vacuum
Figure 6.
Information vacuum
hibernation model
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Government intervention
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chronologically progressive, but exist as periods within the IV such that all organizational
crises will start with the beginning stage but may terminate at different stages, as
demonstrated by the five cases.
The beginning stage manifests along with the birth of a crisis when questions arise and
it is represented by a prominent silence from the organization. For instance, prolonged
silence was apparent in Maggi’s case as the organization kept quiet for over 21 days
(Nestle Website, nd.), while Sony’s long silence was interrupted only by a single
announcement of instructing information. In the cases of Fonterra and SGH, their period of
silence began after providing misleading information and erroneous recall notices by
Fonterra, and speculations by SGH without confirmation of the cause of the Hepatitis C
outbreak. In the case of MH370, its silence was due to the mystery surrounding the plane’s
disappearance and the lack of evidence. While some of these organizations had issued initial
statements early in their crises, their silence and lack of action were pronounced, which led
them into the escalation stage.
In the escalation stage, the IV is exacerbated by several intensifying factors and
represented by mounting criticisms in legacy media reports and negative social media
sentiments. The first factor is the lack of information on the crisis, as demonstrated in
MH370’s case. The information shared was repetitive and obsolete, and the organization
attempted to utilize speculation to answer questions (Eleftheriou-Smith, 2014;
Malaysia Airlines, 2014). Second, attention on the crisis surges when the media hijacks
the crisis. In Maggi’s case, the media offered differing angles on the crisis, such as police
lodging action against endorsing celebrities ( Jha, 2015), more states banning Maggi
(The Times of India, 2015e), Maggi’s recall (The Times of India, 2015b), and political debates
over its ban (Ambardar, 2015). Third, the reactions of the stakeholders are another
influential factor that escalates a crisis. In some cases, organizations had visible support
from their stakeholders (e.g. Sony), while others experienced distancing by relevant industry
players and stakeholders, which further damaged the organization’s image. For example,
former Maggi Spokesperson Amitabh Bachchan clarified that he was no longer an endorser
of its products (The Times of India, 2015a). Similarly, hacker group Anonymous denied the
responsibility for the intrusion of Sony’s systems (Tsukayama, 2011c). During the SGH
crisis, Changi General Hospital, Tan Tock Seng Hospital, and the National Kidney
Foundation distanced themselves from SGH by reassuring the public of their safety
procedures (Lai, 2015b). Another form of escalation takes place when governments or
authorities are called on or see fit to intervene, such as the Chinese Government’s
intervention in the Fonterra crisis (The New Zealand Herald, 2013).
The limbo stage occurs when an organization, due to limitations and obstacles,
persistently remains unable to provide clear, adequate, and satisfactory answers to the main
questions and concerns raised by the media and stakeholders during the earlier stages
of the crisis. This stage is exemplified in the case of MH370 by the lack of crucial
evidence preventing the organization from obtaining any useful or meaningful information
to provide to the public in order to close the vacuum. Mechanisms of this stage were
explicated earlier in RQ4.
However, it is insufficient to merely identify and discuss the stages of an IV. Hence, to add
value to this research, the “Information vacuum development flow chart” (Figure 7) was
conceptualized to map the four different types of developments that could happen during a
crisis: Type 1 (beginning, escalation, and resolution); Type 2 (beginning, escalation, and limbo);
Type 3 (beginning, escalation, limbo, and resolution); and Type 4 (beginning and resolution).
All configurations include the beginning stage, with Types 1-3 sharing the beginning and
escalation stages, but branch out to different stages thereafter. The escalations experienced by
the five organizations indicated they had failed to understand that clear, adequate, and
satisfactory information is still required at all stages of a crisis (Penuel et al., 2013).
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Type 1 (beginning, escalation, and resolution)
This type applies to all the cases studied, except MH370. In Type 1, resolution is the final
stage and is typified by the organization’s satisfactory response or actions, which resulted in
a corresponding moderation of media and/or stakeholder tone, and/or a decline in media
hype and social media hype. For example in the cases of Fonterra and SGH, government
intervention and enquiries alleviated the stakeholders’ worries and provided answers to
the IV. This in turn suppressed the media hijacks in the Fonterra case, while the inquiry
results culled speculations with verified answers in the SGH case. Another observation in
the resolution stage is the resumption to operational normalcy – Sony’s restoration of the
PlayStation Network after 26 days of downtime (Tsukayama, 2011f ) resolved concerns
regarding the offline network and terminated speculations regarding the restoration and
further vulnerabilities of the system (Tsukayama, 2011e). Moreover, Sony’s compensation
plans and measures against identity theft facilitated the hacking crisis’s resolution,
effectively addressing the stakeholders’ worries. The developments of the IV of the four
cases – Sony, Maggi, SGH, and Fonterra – are illustrated in Figure 8.
Type 2 (beginning, escalation, and limbo)
In this study, only the case of MH370 belongs to this IV type. Here, limbo is the end stage,
where organizations do not have or are unable to provide answers, as observed in MH370’s
case when no agency was able to provide concrete information on the location of the missing
plane (Tasnim, 2016). When all avenues are exhausted, the crisis gradually becomes stale as
the media grows weary of receiving repeated responses while stakeholders similarly
experience fatigue from the emotional toll. As interest wanes, the organization allows the
crisis to close without proper resolution and the IV enters hibernation. This signifies the IV’s
transition into limbo and resonates with Pang’s (2013b) suggestion of the IV disappearing.
The development of the IV in MH370’s case is illustrated in Figure 9.
While the IV is hibernating, the crisis’ unanswered questions in limbo will resurface if
any organization experiences a new crisis of a similar nature, such as the subsequent crash
of MH17 from Malaysia Airlines (Nuradzimmah, 2015) or the discovery of unidentified
Beginning
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Limbo
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Figure 7.
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airplane wreckage over a year later (Hani, 2015), renewing the stakeholders’ and media’s
memories of the crisis, and re-igniting their interest. Moreover, the reawakened IV could also
intensify the IV of a new but closely related or similar crisis (Figure 10). When EgyptAir
MS804 went missing on May 19, 2016 (Al Jazeera, 2016), there were many theories and
conspiracies drawn to establish connections between MS804 and MH370. One example
suggested that the disappearance of MS804 was related to MH370 as both tragedies were
exactly 804 days apart (Austin, 2016).
Type 3 (beginning, escalation, limbo, and resolution)
Type 3 is an extension of the Type 2 configuration, where new developments provide
answers to the crucial questions and close the IV. For example, it is conceivable that if
the black box for MH370 were found, the IV would be closed as necessary information could
be supplied to satisfy the stakeholder’s demand for answers.
Type 4 (Beginning and resolution)
Type 4 indicates a well-prepared organization with minimal limitation in obtaining and
releasing information, which allows it to avoid both the escalation and limbo stages.
Hence, Type 4 represents a crisis in which the organization is able to respond swiftly and
adequately to the questions raised in the IV, and is recognized as an excellent example of
crisis management. Such examples include the quick response by Singapore’s
People’s Association (Wong, 2015) to lapses uncovered by the Auditor General’s Office
(The Straits Times, 2015a) and Burger King’s prompt response (CBS News, 2012)
regarding errant workers who had posted photos on social media of themselves standing
on lettuces in the USA.
Beginning
Escalation
Limbo
Resolution
Figure 9.
Information
vacuum development
for MH370
Beginning
Escalation
Limbo
Enlarged
second crisis
New crisis of
similar nature
Resolution
Figure 10.
Expanded information
vacuum development
flow chart
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Conclusion
The analyzed cases demonstrated that an organization’s first formal response does not
necessarily quell the IV but could exacerbate it instead, allowing its continued existence
until official replies satisfy the questions and issues raised. Moreover, in the case of MH370,
the IV’s prolonged existence was due to the nature of the crisis, which prevented the
organization from providing closure. The case studies demonstrated that stakeholders are
satisfied when organizations provide swift, adequate, transparent, credible, and consistent
responses to their queries. Yet interestingly, cases like Sony, where the identity of the hacker
remains unknown, show that depending on the crisis and concerns of the stakeholders, not
all questions need to be answered by the organization. Nevertheless, the organization should
strive to close the IV completely to avoid its reputation and image from being implicated in
future similar crises. Based on the findings, we would like to redefine the IV as “a period of
persisting stakeholder and media dissatisfaction, and knowledge gaps between the onset
of questions arising from a crisis and the organization’s official satisfactory response to each
of those queries. It is manifested as silence types and exacerbated by the organization’s
ability and willingness to provide timely and necessary information.”
One limitation of this study is the lack of cases featuring organizational evasive silence
for better examination of the phenomenon. Another limitation is the lack of cases similar to
MH370 for better examination of the interest hibernation-revival cycle, limbo stage, and how
a second crisis can expand an existing IV. The third limitation is that we were unable to
collect data uniformly from a single social media source, for example, collect FB data across
five cases. This was because we discovered that some online platforms did not yield
sufficient data for analysis. However, even with this methodological limitation, the findings
can provide useful insights on the concept of IV.
The study, as a whole, provides a guide for navigating the IV and conceptualizing crisis
responses to mitigate the situation. Its results allow practitioners to identify their
organization’s present stage in the IV and learn from the IV’s mechanism to determine the
appropriate actions necessary for contraction and resolution of the IV. Finally, the findings
can also help organizations improve their preparation and planning of crisis responses and
communications for the effective management of the IV during a crisis, and work toward a
correspondingly swift and early closure of the crisis. Future research could investigate the
extent of damages associated with the different types of IVs and efficacy of strategies
employed in those permutations. Furthermore, as the Type 4 configuration is presently
hypothetical in nature, future research could test and verify Type 4’s viability and presence.
As the cases are selected from different countries and societies, there is potential value in
conducting future research that investigates the relationships between differing societal
and/or organizational cultures, and the information vacuum.
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